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Abstract
In this article we propose a multi-zonal integrated energy-reserve market model. We
assume that bidders may submit their demand and supply bids on the one hand in the form
of conventional hourly step bids and block bids, which are cleared and paid according to
market clearing prices (MCPs). On the other hand, suppliers may submit so called flexible
production bids, while both suppliers and consumers may submit fill-or-kill type package-
priced combined bids – these bids are accepted if their acceptance implies an improvement
in the resulting total social welfare, which the market clearing algorithm aims to optimize.
The model includes network constraints for the nominal case (if no reserves are activated)
and also for perturbed cases when the allocated reserves are activated.
1 Introduction
The most important aim of electricity markets is to harmonize power demand and supply
in a way, which in ideal case results in the highest possible social welfare (SW). The
concept of SW basically originates from the ’pay as clear’ principle [31]. In the most
simple framework for electricity market clearing, supply and demand bids are submitted
for a single period of the trading interval, each bid being described by two parameters, the
bid quantity and the bid price per unit (PPU). In the case of demand bids, the product of
the bid quantity and the PPU describes the willingness to pay for the required quantity,
while in the case of supply bids, the same product corresponds to the minimal required
income for the offered amount (usually assumed to be equal to the cost of the production).
The market is cleared according to the so called market clearing price (MCP): Demand
bids with bid PPU lower than the MCP will be rejected, as well as supply bids with bid
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PPU higher than the MCP. Bids whose PPU is equal to the MCP may be also partially
accepted.
Bids are paid for according to the MCP, which means that the bidder, e.g. in the case
of an accepted demand bid, pays less for the required quantity compared to his willingness
to pay (and similarly, supply bidders receive potentially more payment for accepted supply
bids). This surplus, which is the product of the difference between the bid PPU and the
MCP and the bid quantity, is called the social welfare (SW) of the bid [17, 18]. The total
social welfare (TSW) of a dispatch is the sum of SW values corresponding to single bids,
and may be represented as the area between the supply and the demand curve as depicted
in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: Social welfare of single bids in the one-period market model. Si and Di correspond
to supply and demand bids, while MCP stands for the market clearing price.
In the simple one-period example depicted in Fig. 1, the maximization of TSW is triv-
ial: We determine the MCP from the intersection of supply and demand curves (this will
ensure the energy balance), and clear the market according to this MCP. There are two
factors which make the problem more complex. On the one hand, the clearing is performed
simultaneously for multiple periods, and there are bids which imply interconnections be-
tween different periods (e.g. they have the ’fill or kill’ property – they must be accepted in
all included periods or must be completely rejected). Minimum income condition orders
and scheduled stop conditions can imply similar interconnections between periods [27]. On
the other hand, we may have multiple price zones, connected with transmission lines. In
this case the energy balance is not required for every single price zone, but it must hold
for the total system, while the transmission constraints of the connecting lines must be
taken into account [21].
In addition, operators of the power system have to ensure the stability and security.
In the current setup, as we assume the central authority operates the market with regard
to the transmission system as well, we will use the terminology of independent system
operator (ISO).
Stability refers to frequency stability [35] or voltage stability [32], while security refers
to e.g. n-1 line and node contingency, which means that if one of the lines or one of the
nodes of the network fails instantly, the resulting flows may not overload any of the remain-
ing lines [16]. The stability of frequency is dependent on the supply-demand balance: If
consumers or suppliers deviate from their predefined schedule, the ISO activates previously
allocated (positive or negative) reserves at generating units to restore the balance.
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These reserves practically mean rights for the ISO to give orders to generating units to
increase or decrease actual generation values. In most of the countries where a liberalized
electricity trade takes place, separate markets were created for the allocation of such and
other reserves, called altogether ancillary services [24].
Joint (or integrated) energy and reserve markets are representing a concept, where the
allocation of power and reserve to generating units takes place not on disjoint markets,
but in one integrated auction [15].
One main benefit of integrated markets is described in [25] as: ’co-optimization en-
ables the participants to achieve more surplus by providing an efficient way to submit all
possible combinations of energy-reserve allocation to the market. Therefore the risk of pre-
committing generating capacity to sequential offers of different products and clearing can
be eliminated ’. The paper [14] formulates a similar consideration as ’Since distinct reserve
services can in fact be strongly coupled, and the heuristics required to bridge the various se-
quential markets can ultimately lead to loss of social welfare, simultaneous energy/reserves
market-clearing procedures have been proposed and are in use. However, they generally
schedule reserve services subject to exogenous rules and parameters that do not relate to
actual operating conditions’.
While several results have been already published in the field of integrated markets, the
presented approaches usually are driven by the unit-commitment spirit of North American
market models, where the generating units are not self-scheduling. A not self-scheduling
clearing means that generating units submit technical characteristics and production costs
to the ISO who determines production levels and reserve allocations according to these
parameters.
The main aim of the current paper is to provide a possible framework for multi-node
integrated markets, but in contrast to the cost minimization approach used e.g. in [34],
we aim at maximizing the total social welfare (SW). The paper [14] proposes a security
constrained simultaneous clearing of energy and reserve services with a perturbation ap-
proach similar to the one proposed in the current paper. This paper considers primary,
secondary and tertiary reserves as well and uses generals function for the description of
the social welfare. The supply side in [14] is also formulated in a unit-commitment spirit.
The approach of the paper [3] is similar, it also proposes that at any given network bus
all scheduled reserve types should be priced not at separate rates but at a common rate
equal to the marginal cost of security at that bus. The paper [2] uses a multiobjective
mathematical programming (MMP) approach including MCPs as well in the formulation.
The paper [1] uses also an MMP approach, defining the MCP only for the energy.
In contrast, in European type markets, the self-scheduling generating units may bid
with a variety of products, and act like more active market participants [6]. An approach
for co-optimizing power and reserve allocation which is motivated by this type of power
market is described in the articles [25, 23, 12].
In the day-ahead market, where the clearing is determined for 24 consecutive hours,
technological considerations of generating units imply further challenges (in integrated and
conventional markets as well). Startup costs and minimal operating loads are the most
common sources of non-convexities, but we may also think of minimal up and down times.
These non-convexities are usually handled by the introduction of block orders, which may
be rejected or accepted in a binary manner (no partial acceptance is allowed), thus the
representative variables in the clearing are binary.
An approach to represent the constant and variable costs (corresponding to start-
up and production respectively) of generating units is the concept of minimum income
condition (MIC) orders [10, 28, 29, 26, 30]. As described in [26], ’minimum income orders
3
are supply orders consisting of several hourly step bids for potentially different market
hours, and they are bound together by the MIC which prescribes that the overall income of
the MIC order must cover its given costs’. The efficient clearing of such bids is described
in [30]. In this framework, generation costs corresponding to this type of bid are zero if
the bid is rejected, otherwise they are considered with a fixed and a linear variable term
which are determined by the bidder. Incomes in the case of the proposed MIC bid can
be expressed as the product of accepted quantities and MCPs. In this concept, since the
elements of the MIC bids are standard hourly step bids, the generation profile of the unit
submitting the MIC bid is fully determined by the MCPs.
In this paper we propose a somewhat different approach, namely we introduce the
concept of flexible production bids (shortly FP bids) and combined bids. As we will see,
flexible production bids are formed in the spirit of unit commitment: The production
values for the single periods are determined by the ISO during the clearing, considering
the technical and cost parameters of the unit. Technical parameters are the load gradient
constraints, while the cost parameters are the start-up and variable cost values. Combined
bids in contrast hold fixed quantities of power and reserve and are cleared and paid as a
whole package if accepted.
In addition we also consider the coupling of combined power-reserve markets, which
mean that we formulate transmission constraints on nominal flows and also flows origi-
nating from the activation of reserves. We use a linear DC load flow based framework to
formulate the transmission constraints.
The proposed framework may be also considered as a kind of transition between Euro-
pean and US type markets in the sense that on the one hand conventional price-quantity
(step) bids are submitted, and on the other hand generating units may also submit genera-
tion characteristics in the form of FP bids, in which case their power and reserve allocation
will be scheduled by the ISO. In addition, participants may also submit fixed-price com-
bined bids, which represent basically pay-as-bid type bids.
Since the problem formulation in itself is a complex challenge (even if we would consider
only ’conventional’ coupling of integrated markets without innovative bid types), in this
paper we confine ourselves to present only the details of the formulation, and only shortly
discuss the computational properties and demands of the resulting optimization problem.
2 The market model
The notations used through the paper are summarized in Appendix A. The basis of the
proposed framework is a standard uniform price (European type) multi-node (or in other
words zonal) electricity market model with T time periods (see e.g. the basic structure in
[17]).
In the current paper we only consider reserves corresponding to frequency control.
Furthermore, to keep the initial model formulation tractable we focus only on secondary
reserves. We assume that reserve-providing units are paid for the allocation of reserve
capacities, in other words in the current model we do not take into account if reserves are
activated or not. The possibility of allocating secondary and tertiary reserves simultane-
ously in the proposed framework is discussed in section 3.
2.1 Bid types in the model
We suppose in the following that one period of the model corresponds to one hour.
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2.1.1 One hour bids
One-hour single-product bids These bids are the principal elements of the market
model. They describe demand or supply of a single product (power, positive or negative
reserve) in a single time period, and their acceptance is independent of the acceptance of
bids regarding other time periods.
It can be assumed that most bids are submitted in this format to the market. These
bids are characterized by a quantity (B), by the index of the time period in which the bid
is relevant (t) and a respective price (per unit), denoted by Θ.
Such one-hour bids are cleared according to MCPs denoted by ϕPi (t), ϕ
Rp
i (t) and
ϕRni (t) corresponding to power, positive and negative reserve respectively in each node i,
regarding the respective time period t. If the resulting MCP is equal PPU of a bid, the
partial acceptance of the bid is allowed, formally the bid acceptance indicator y is ∈ [0, 1]
in this case.
2.1.2 Multiple period bids
Under multiple period bids we mean bids which may include multiple periods as well, but
must be taken into account and cleared as a single bid.
Block bids In our terminology, under block bids we mean single product (power or
reserve) bids, which include multiple (consecutive) time periods. We assume that block
bids have the fill-or-kill property, in the sense that either the total offered quantity is either
fully accepted for all respective time periods, or the bid is completely rejected.
These bids are characterized by quantities for the corresponding hours (B – a vector
in this case), by the indices of the time periods in which the bid is relevant (t) and the
respective PPUs, denoted by Θ (also a vector). Although in the practice the bid quantities
and PPUs usually are the same for every period of the bid, the vector formulation allows
potentially different quantities and PPUs for each period.
The acceptance constraint in the case of block bids is that the resulting total SW must
be positive [18]. The total SW of a block bid is the sum of the SWs corresponding to the
included time periods. Block bids are very common in electricity markets and they are
discussed e.g. in [19, 18].
Remark: Standard bids In the following, under standard bids we mean to 1-hour
single-product bids or block bids. We distinguish these bids from the bid types described
in the following, since their acceptance is explicitly determined by MCPs.
Flexible production bids Flexible production or FP bids are suited for generating
units who practically offer their generating capacity in a unit-commitment type offer.
Upon the acceptance of such bids, the ISO assigns nonzero power and reserve amounts to
units submitting these bids for each period included in the bid, according to the actual
needs of the market. These bids are characterized in the proposed model by start-up cost
(α), variable cost (β) and ramp constraints (RU for ramp-up and RD for ramp-down).
The maximal possible amount of assigned reserve is determined by the assigned power
production profile and by the ramp constraints (e.g. if in two consecutive periods the
output of the unit according to the power production profile is increased with RU , no
positive reserve may be assigned to it).
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If an FP bid is accepted, the generating unit is paid off according to produced quantities
(determined by the ISO) and respective MCPs, and its income must cover the reported
expenses of generation, derived from start-up and variable costs. The formulation of last
consideration may be viewed as a variant of the so called minimum income condition (MIC)
[28, 29, 26].
Example 1 To illustrate the concept of FP bids, let us consider a simple 2 period
example. Let us assume that the set of standard (in this case only 1-hour) bids is as
summarized in Table 1.
bid ID relevant period quantity (B) PPU (Θ)
D11 1 15 90
D12 1 20 80
S11 1 27 75
S12 1 13 85
D21 2 15 90
D22 2 20 80
S21 2 27 75
S22 2 13 85
Table 1: Standard bids in of example 1 (the upper index in the bid ID refers to the period)
We can see in Table 1 that the standard bids are the same for hour 1 and 2, thus they
imply the supply-demand curves depicted in Fig. 2 for both hours.
Figure 2: Supply-demand curves of example 1
First let us assume the scenario where no other bids are present. In this case, the
dispatch calculation is very simple: The MCP (denoted by ϕ) is determined by the inter-
section of the curves (ϕ=80): D1 and S1 will be fully accepted while D2 will be partially
accepted. The social welfare of the demand and supply side in each period may be calcu-
lated as:
SWD = (90− 80)15 = 150
SW S = (80− 75)27 = 135 ,
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thus the total social welfare equals to 285 for each period thus TSW=570.
On the other hand, let us assume a scenario, when in addition to the standard bids,
an FP bid is also present with the parameters α = 3000, β = 28 (we can assume that RU
and RD are arbitrary positive values).
In this case let us consider the scenario where ϕ = 72 for both periods. According
to the MCP, the standard supply bids will be rejected (as their PPU is higher than the
MCP), while both demand bids will be fully accepted, resulting in the social welfare
SWD = (90 − 72)15 + (80− 72)20 = 430
for both periods. Regarding the supply side, the unit corresponding to the FP bid has
to produce 35 MW in each period. The cost of the production of the FP bid may be
calculated as α + 2β35 = 4960, while the income of the FP bid is 35 · 72 · 2 = 5040.
The income of the bid covers the production cost (which is a necessary condition for the
acceptance of the FP bid), and SW S = 80. In this case TSW = 860 + 80 = 940.
As the TSW is higher in the case of the second scenario (940 vs 570), if the FP
bid is also present in the market, the market clearing algorithm will prefer the second
solution, as it aims to maximize the TSW . In general, in order to maximize the TSW,
the market clearing algorithm has to determine the MCPs and the acceptance of FP bids
simultaneously.
Let us note furthermore that the acceptance of the FP bid is not explicitly determined
by the MCP: If we lower the PPU of the first and the second supply bid to 60 and 72
respectively, and suppose ϕ = 72, both demand bids will be accepted (while S2 will be
partially accepted to ensure the power balance) and we get
SWD = (90 − 72)15 + (80− 72)20 = 430
SW S = (72 − 60)27+ = 324
for each period, resulting in TSW = 1508, a solution clearly preferable compared to the
acceptance of the FP bid.
Regarding the notations corresponding to FP bids in the model, as in general we
consider multiple nodes, we assume that each FP bid corresponds to a generating unit in
a certain node of the network. Each node may hold multiple generating units, but not
all nodes necessarily hold generating units. We use binary variables to describe whether a
generating unit operates or not in a given time period. vij(t) denotes the activity indicator
of unit j of node i at time t. Units are indexed from 1 in each node. For example if there
are 2 units in node 1 and 1 unit in node two, we will have variables v11(t), v12(t) and
v21(t) for each time period t. With the help of these binary variables we can describe
start-up costs, minimal up and down times and minimal load of units. On the other hand,
we suppose that if the corresponding activity indicator is 0, the output of the unit is 0
(regarding power, and both types of reserves as well). Pij(t) denotes the power production
value allocated to unit j of node i at time t. Regarding reserves, Rpij(t) and Rnij(t)
denote respectively the positive and negative reserve value allocated to unit j of node i at
time t.
Combined bids Combined bids in the proposed framework make possible to submit
bids simultaneously for power and reserve production (or consumption). In the case of
combined bids, the bid holds fixed values of power, positive and negative reserves, poten-
tially including multiple time periods. The parameters of this bid type are the amounts
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of products offered for the respective time periods, and total price. The price is not inter-
preted as per unit in this case, but as a total amount, which shall be at least paid to the
bidder upon acceptance – independent of MCPs. In addition to this fixed price, to each
combined bid a nonnegative surplus is assigned by the MO (see the details later).
We assume that combined bids have the fill-or-kill property and we call the standard
bids and combined bids fixed quantity (FQ) bids (in contrast to FP bids where the quantity
is assigned to the bid by the ISO).
Example 2 To illustrate the concept of combined bids, let us suppose a single-period
scenario, where the standard power and reserve bids are as summarized in table 2 (the
power bids define the same supply-demand curves as in Example 1). In the case of this
simple example we consider only one type of reserve (arbitrarily + or -).
bid ID quantity (B) PPU (Θ)
DP1 15 90
DP2 20 80
SP1 27 75
SP2 13 85
DR1 10 50
DR2 10 40
SR1 15 45
Table 2: Standard bids in of example 2 (the upper index refers to power/reserve)
Again, let us first assume the scenario where no other bids are present. In this case
ϕP = 80, ϕR = 45, resulting in SWP = 285 and SWR = 50 (TSW = 335) – the balance
is 27 MW regarding power and 10 MW regarding the reserve.
On the other hand, if in addition to the standard bids we also assume a combined
bid offering 15 MW of power and 15 MW of reserve at the price of 1600, the following
dispatch is possible. Regarding the power balance, if ϕP = 75, both demand bids are
accepted resulting in the demand of 35 MW, from which 20 MW of power is supplied from
the first standard supply bid (which is partially accepted), and the rest from the combined
bid.
Regarding the reserve balance, the standard reserve supply bid is rejected, the first
standard reserve demand bid is fully accepted while the second one is partially accepted.
All 15 MWs of reserve are supplied by the accepted combined bid.
Here we have to check two conditions. First the total income from demand bids must
cover the total cost of supply. The income from power demand bids is (15+20)75 = 2625,
while the income from reserve demand bids is (10 + 5)40 = 600, thus the total income is
3225. The cost of the standard power supply bid is 75 · 20 = 1500, while the cost of the
combined bid is 1600 The total cost is 3100 – the difference between the total income and
the total cost (125) will be assigned to the surplus of the combined bid in this case.
Second, the TSW must exceed the TSW of the first scenario in order to make the
dispatch more desirable for the clearing algorithm.
SWP = (90− 75)15 + (80 − 75) ∗ 20 = 325
SWR = (50− 40)10 = 100 ,
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while the SW of the combined bid is equal to its surplus (125), thus TSW = 540 > 335.
2.1.3 Overview of bids
Fixed quantity and flexible production Except for FP bids, for all bids we can
say that we know how much they will contribute to power and reserve balances upon their
acceptance (partial acceptance is allowed only in the case of one-hour single-product bids).
We can call these bids fixed quantity (FQ) bids. We assume that demand bids are always
FQ. The set B collets all FQ bid types, regarding the traded product (not distinguishing
between one-hour and multiple hour bids).
B = {DP, SP, DRp, SRp, DRn, SRn, DC, SC} (1)
The first letter stands for demand or supply, while the rest stand for power (P), positive
reserve (Rp), negative reserve (Rn) or combined bids (C). These abbreviations are used
through the paper.
Figure 3 summarizes the bid types used through the paper and their properties.
Figure 3: Bid types in the proposed market formulation. P&R stands for power and reserve.
2.2 Clearing of the market
We may depict the one-hour single product (e.g. power) demand and supply bids for any
particular hour in the standard spot-market fashion like in Fig. 4. By such an ordering of
bids (increasing by PPU in the case of supply and decreasing in the case of demand), if
there are enough bids for the curves to intersect in every hour, setting the MCPs according
to the intersection prices clears the market (in this case however no block bids, FP bids
or combined bids are taken into account, thus all of such bids are rejected).
On the other hand if we consider a scenario of the MCP depicted in Fig. 4, we can
see that there is an imbalance both in the supplied/consumed power (Bd1 − Bs1), and
regarding incomes/costs as well. The total income is I1+I2 = Bd1ϕ while the total cost of
the accepted supply bid is C1 = Bs1ϕ. To put the principle of the clearing very short, we
may use the excess income (summed for all hours) to pay for block, FP and combined bids
which cover the hourly power/reserve imbalances (as detailed in Example 1 of subsection
2.1.2 and depicted in Fig. 2)
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Figure 4: Power and income/cost imbalances caused by the particular depicted MCP. ϕ stands
for the MCP, while θd and θs denotes the demand and supply bid prices.
The task of the market-clearing algorithm is to find such MCPs, and such scheduling of
FP, block and combined bids (via determination of their scheduling/acceptance variables1),
which maximizes the total social welfare, and respects the hourly power and reserve balance
constraints as well as the network bottlenecks.
2.3 Assumptions regarding the multi-nodal market structure
The following assumptions determine the size of the variable vectors.
• We assume N nodes.
• The number of units at node i is denoted by ni. We assume that each unit submits
a FP bid. The total number of units, which do submit FP bids is denoted by n.
∑
i
ni = n (2)
• mDPi denotes the number of standard demand power bids at node i.
• mSPi denotes the number of standard supply power bids at node i.
• mDRpi denotes the number of standard positive reserve demand bids at node i.
• mSRpi denotes the number of standard positive reserve supply bids at node i.
• mDRni denotes the number of standard negative reserve demand bids at node i.
• mSRni denotes the number of standard negative reserve supply bids at node i.
• mDCi denotes the number of combined demand bids at node i.
• mSCi denotes the number of combined supply bids at node i.
• m denotes the total number of FQ bids.
1To be more precise, in the case of combined bids, the payoff variables have to be determined as well
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Furthermore we define the following variables.
mDP =
∑
i
mDPi , m
SP =
∑
i
mSPi
mDRp =
∑
i
mDRpi , m
SRp =
∑
i
mSRpi , m
DRn =
∑
i
mDRni , m
SRn =
∑
i
mSRni
mDC =
∑
i
mDCi , m
SC =
∑
i
mSCi
m = mDP +mSP +mDRp +mDSp +mDRnmSRn +mDC +mSC (3)
2.4 Variables of the model
In this subsection, according to the previous considerations, we enumerate the variables
of the proposed framework.
2.4.1 Variables corresponding to the clearing of FP bids
• vij(t) denotes the up indicator of unit j of node i at time t, equals to 1 if unit j
of node i is operating at time period T and zero otherwise. The vector of all such
variables is denoted by v ∈ {0, 1}n(T+1). vij(O) is an auxiliary variable, which is
equal to one if the unit is up in any of the periods in the analyzed time frame (used
for the calculation of start-up costs). The structure of v is as follows.
v =


v1
v2
...
vN

 vi =


vi1
vi2
...
vini

 vij =


vij(1)
vij(2)
...
vij(T )
vij(O)

 (4)
• Pij(t) denotes the power production value allocated to unit j of node i at time t,
Rpij(t) denotes the positive reserve allocated to unit j of node i at time t, and Rnij(t)
denotes the negative reserve allocated to unit j of node i at time t. P ∈ {0, 1}nT ,
Rp ∈ {0, 1}nT , Rn ∈ {0, 1}nT .
P =


P1
P2
...
PN

 Pi =


Pi1
Pi2
...
Pini

 Pij =


Pij(1)
Pij(2)
...
Pij(T )

 (5)
Rp =


Rp1
Rp2
...
RpN

 Rpi =


Rpi1
Rpi2
...
Rpini

 Rpij =


Rpij(1)
Rpij(2)
...
Rpij(T )

 (6)
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Rn =


Rn1
Rn2
...
RnN

 Rni =


Rni1
Rni2
...
Rnini

 Rnij =


Rnij(1)
Rnij(2)
...
Rnij(T )

 (7)
2.4.2 Variables corresponding to MCPs and bid acceptance indica-
tors
• ϕPi (t) denotes the MCP of power at node i at time t.
• ϕRpi (t) denotes the MCP of positive reserve at node i at time t.
• ϕRni (t) denotes the MCP of negative reserve at node i at time t.
ϕ =

 ϕPϕRp
ϕRn

 ϕP =


ϕP1
ϕP2
...
ϕPN

ϕPi =


ϕPi (1)
ϕPi (2)
...
ϕPi (T )

 (8)
ϕ ∈ R3NT+ . ϕ
Rp and ϕRn are similarly derived.
• ybij is the bid acceptance indicator of the standard bid of type b ∈ B, corresponding
to j-th such bid of node i. ybij ∈ {0, 1} in the case of fill-or-kill bids.
y =


yDP
ySP
yDRp
yDRn
ySRp
ySRn
yDC
ySC


yDP =


yDP1
yDP2
...
yDPN

 yDPi =


yDPi (1)
yDPi (2)
...
yDPi (m
DP
i )

 (9)
yt blocks for other types are similarly derived.
2.4.3 Variables corresponding to discounts/surpluses of combined
bids
• In the proposed model, while the standard bids are characterized by price per unit
(PPU) bid prices and cleared based on MCP values represented by the variables
ϕ, the combined bids are characterized by the package price – in other words total
maximal/minimal payoffs (regarding supply and demand respectively). While the
SW in the case of the standard bids originates and may be calculated from the
difference between market clearing MCPs (denoted by φ), we assume that in the
case of combined bids the maximal/minimal payoffs are subject to discount and
surplus, which do also contribute to the total social welfare. WDij and W
S
ij denote the
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payoff discount of the combined demand bid j submitted in node i and the payoff
surplus of the combined supply bid j submitted in node i respectively.
W =
(
WD
W S
)
WD =


WD1
...
WDN

 WDi =


WDi1
...
WD
imDC
i

 (10)
W S may be similarly derived. WD ∈ Rm
DC
+ , W
S ∈ Rm
SC
+ .
Any WDij or W
S
ij may be greater than zero only, if the corresponding combined bid
is accepted.
2.4.4 The full state vector
The full state vector of the model may be derived as
x =


v
P
Rp
Rn
ϕ
y
W


(11)
x ∈ Rn(4T+1)+3NT+m+m
DC+mSC
2.5 Cost model of the generating units
The total cost of operation of the jth unit in node i, denoted by CGij is assumed to be
linear and may be derived as
CGij =
∑
t
βijPij(t) + αijvij(O) (12)
where the first term describes the variable cost of production, depending on the output
level of the unit, and the second term describes the start-up cost. The start up cost is
considered in our framework for the whole modelled period. If the unit is e.g. turned
off and on again in the analyzed time frame, it is considered as a warm start-up with
negligible cost. However, based on the introduced variables vij(t) the warm start-up costs
may be taken into account as well, if necessary. More complex and detailed formulations
of start-up costs may be easily considered, following the methodology of the description
of these costs in unit commitment approaches [8, 33].
We denote the total generation cost with CG.
CG =
∑
ij
CGij (13)
2.6 Auxiliary variables of the model
We introduce a set of auxiliary variables, which will be used in the formulation of con-
straints and the objective functions. these variables do depend on the previously intro-
duced primary model variables and on parameters.
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2.6.1 Demand side
Power type variables We assume that the matrix BDPi ∈ R
T×mDP
i holds the bid
quantities of the standard demand power bids corresponding to node i, given as a model
parameter. In this matrix, each row corresponds to a time period and each column cor-
responds to a bid. BDPi (t, k) corresponds to the amount of the k-th demand power bid
in node i regarding time period t. For conventional bids, which regard only one period,
only one element of the corresponding column is nonzero, while for block bids, multiple
elements may be nonzero.
Similarly, BDCPi ∈ R
T×mDC
i denotes the bid quantities corresponding to the power
components of the combined demand bids submitted in node i.
The total power demand at node i in time period t, denoted by DPi (t) may be derived
as
DPi (t) = B
DP
i (t, .)y
DP
i + B
DCP
i (t, .)y
DC
i (14)
where M(t, .) denotes the t-th row of the matrix M .
The total net power demand in time period t, denoted by DP (t) may be derived as
DP (t) =
∑
i
DPi (t) (15)
The total positive and negative reserve demands at node i at time t, denoted by DRpi
and DRni respectively may be derived similarly via the matrices B
DRp
i , B
DRn
i , B
DCRp
i and
BDCRni and the variables y
DRp
i , y
DRn
i , y
DC
i , y
DC
i .
DRpi (t) = B
DRp
i (t, .)y
DRp
i + B
DCRp
i (t, .)y
DC
i
DRni (t) = B
DRn
i (t, .)y
DRn
i + B
DCRn
i (t, .)y
DC
i (16)
The total net reserve demands for time period t are as
DRp(t) =
∑
i
DRpi (t) D
Rn(t) =
∑
i
DRni (t) (17)
Income type variables We may decompose the total income (I) by nodes (Ii).
I =
∑
i
Ii (18)
we may further decompose Ii according to the various bid types
Ii = I
DP
i + I
DRp
i + I
DRn
i + I
DC
i (19)
IDPi =
(
ϕPi
)T
BDPi y
DP
i (20)
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and similarly,
IDRpi =
(
ϕRpi
)T
BDRpi y
DRp
i (21)
IDRni =
(
ϕRni
)T
BDRni y
DRn
i (22)
while for combined bids
IDCi =
(
yDCi
)T ((
ΘDCi
)T
+WDi
)
(23)
2.6.2 Supply side
In contrast to the demand side, the supply side of the model is composed not only from the
FQ bids, but also from the FP bids. We use the upper indices FQ and FP to distinguish
between these two types of bids.
Power type variables Similarly to the demand case, the matrix BSPi ∈ R
T×mSP
i
describe the bid quantities of the standard supply power bids corresponding to node i.
BSPi (j, k) corresponds to the amount of the k-th supply power bid in node i regarding
time period j.
Similarly, BCSPi ∈ R
T×mSC
i denotes the bid quantities corresponding to the power
components of the combined supply bids submitted in node i.
The total power supply by FQ bids at node i in time period t, denoted by SPFQi (t)
may be derived as
SPFQi (t) = B
SP
i (t, .)y
SP
i + B
CSP
i (t, .)y
SC
i (24)
The total net power supplied by FQ bids in time period t, denoted by SPFQ(t) is simply
SPFQ(t) =
∑
i
SPFQi (t) (25)
The total positive and negative reserves supplied by FQ bids at node i at time t, denoted
by SRpFQi and S
RnFQ
i respectively may be derived similarly via the matrices B
SRp
i , B
SRn
i ,
BSCRpi and B
SCRn
i and the variables y
SRp
i , y
SRn
i , y
SC
i , y
SC
i .
SRpFQi (t) = B
SRp
i (t, .)y
SRp
i + B
SCRp
i (t, .)y
SC
i
SRnFQi (t) = B
SRn
i (t, .)y
SRn
i + B
SCRn
i (t, .)y
SC
i (26)
The net balances are
SRpFQ(t) =
∑
i
SRpFQi (t) S
RnFQ(t) =
∑
i
SRnFQi (t) (27)
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Power type variables corresponding to FP bids For the description of the
constraints corresponding to the sum of allocated power and reserve we will need the
following variables.
Regarding FP bids, the i-th element of the following vector S
PFP
(t) (denoted by
S
PFP
i (t)) describes the maximal power supplied by FP bids at node i at time t.
S
PFP
(t) = P


v11(t)
...
v1n1(t)
v21(t)
...
vNnN (t)


(28)
where P is a matrix holding the maximal production values of units, where the rows are
corresponding to nodes. P (i, k) 6= 0 if and only if unit k is located in node i.
Similarly, regarding minimal power output of FP bids
SPFP (t) = P


v11(t)
...
v1n1(t)
v21(t)
...
vNnN (t)


(29)
where P is a matrix holding the minimal production values of units, where the rows are
corresponding to nodes. P (i, k) may be 6= 0 only if unit k is located in node i.
Regarding the potential reserve production by FP bids, the i-th element of the following
vector S
RpFP
(t) (denoted by S
RpFP
i (t)) describes the maximal positive reserve supplied
by FP bids at node i at time t.
S
RpFP
(t) = Rp


v11(t)
...
v1n1(t)
v21(t)
...
vNnN (t)


(30)
where Rp is a matrix holding the maximal positive reserve capacity values of units, where
the rows are corresponding to nodes. These values correspond to the theoretical maximum
of positive reserve production, corresponding to technological constraints of the unit (load
gradient constraints). The actual maximum of positive reserve may be lower compared to
this value, e.g. if the plant is operating at maximum capacity, the actual available positive
reserve is 0.
Rp(i, k) may be 6= 0 if and only if unit k is located in node i.
The vector S
RnFP
(t) corresponding to negative reserves may be derived similarly, via
the matrix Rn.
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Cost type variables Similarly to the case of income, the total cost (C) is also de-
composed by nodes (Ci). Furthermore the payoff discounts (WD) and payoff surpluses
(W S) are also considered as costs. The reason for this is that in equations (23) and (32)
the combined bids are accounted for with their nominal bid value, but thanks to payoff
discounts and payoff surpluses (W ) the incomes will be less and the costs will be higher (if
the respective element of W is greater than zero). W represents the contribution of these
bids to the total social welfare.
C =
∑
i
Ci +
∑
i
WDi +
∑
i
W Si (31)
we may further decompose Ci according to the various bid types
Ci = C
SP
i + C
SRp
i + C
SRn
i + C
SC
i +K
FP
i (32)
Here the difference compared to Eq. (19) is the last term describing the payoff of FP
bids, which is considered as a cost from the point of view of the auctioneer.
CSPi =
(
ϕPi
)T
BSPi y
SP
i (33)
and similarly,
CSRpi =
(
ϕRpi
)T
BSRpi y
SRp
i (34)
CSRni =
(
ϕRni
)T
BSRni y
SRn
i (35)
while for combined bids
CSCi =
(
ySCi
)T ((
ΘSCi
)T
+W Si
)
(36)
Cost type variables corresponding to FP bids We decompose the nodal FP
bid costs (payoffs) to individual costs of generating units as
KFPi =
∑
j
KFPij j ∈ {1, ..., ni} K
FP =
∑
i
KFPi (37)
KFPij may be determined based on the actual allocated power and reserve production,
and the relevant MCPs.
KFPij =
∑
t
Pij(t)ϕ
P
i (t) +Rpij(t)ϕ
Rp
i (t) +Rnij(t)ϕ
Rn
i (t) (38)
2.7 Constraints
In the following subsection the constraints of the model are summarized.
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2.7.1 Constraints corresponding to the range of variables
First, we have to define constraints describing that power and reserves may be allocated
only to active units, considering maximal and minimal output levels
Pij(t) +Rpij(t) ≤ P (i, j)vij(t) ∀ i, j, t (39)
Pij(t)−Rnij(t) ≥ P (i, j)vij(t) ∀ i, j, t (40)
Second, for acceptance indicators we have
0 ≤ y ≤ 1 (41)
in addition, for block bids the corresponding y values are binary.
2.7.2 Bid acceptance constraints
1-hour bids In the case of 1-hour standard bids, the acceptance constraints are very
simple. In the case of demand bids, they describe that the corresponding indicator variable
ybij ≥ 0 if and only if the difference of the bid price and the relevant nodal price is
nonnegative.
The matrix ΘDPi ∈ R
T×mDP
i holds the bid PPUs of the standard power demand bids
corresponding to node i. In this matrix each column corresponds to a bid. ΘDPi (t, k) cor-
responds to the price of the k-th bid in node i, regarding time period t. For a conventional
standard 1-hour bid, only one element in the corresponding column is nonzero, and its
position is the same as of the nonzero element in the corresponding column in BDPi (the
matrix holding the bid quantities). ΘDRpi and Θ
DRn
i correspond to the prices of positive
and negative standard demand reserve bids of node i.
In the case of 1-hour demand power bids we have the following rules
yDPik > 0 → ϕ
P
i (trel) ≤ Θ
DP
i (trel, k) ∀k, i
yDPik < 1 → ϕ
P
i (trel) ≥ Θ
DP
i (trel, k) ∀k, i (42)
where trel corresponds to the (relevant) time period, where the power demand correspond-
ing quantity to yDPik is nonzero, which equals to the index of the nonzero element in the
column vector BDPi (., k) of the matrix B
DP
i .
Similarly, in the case of 1-hour supply power bids
ySPik > 0 → ϕ
P
i (trel) ≥ Θ
SP
i (trel, k) ∀k, i
ySPik < 1 → ϕ
P
i (trel) ≤ Θ
SP
i (trel, k) ∀k, i (43)
For the 1-hour positive/negative reserve demand/supply bids similar constraints may
be derived mutatis mutandis.
Block bids In the case of multiple-hour standard bids (block bids) we have to first
define the SW value (denoted by Ψ) of the bid. In the case of demand bids, if the j-th bid
of node i is a block bid we have
ΨDPij =
∑
t
ΨDPij (t)
ΨDPij (t) =
(
BDPi (t, j) · (θ
DP
i (t, j) − ϕ
P
i (t))
)
(44)
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The corresponding constraint describes that the block bid is accepted if and only if its
SW is positive.
yDPij = 1 ⇔ Ψ
DP
ij > 0 (45)
Again, for the positive/negative reserve demand/supply block bids (if such bids are
present), similar constraints may be derived mutatis mutandis.
Other bids For other (combined and FP) bids we do not have explicit acceptance
constraints, these bids are accepted or rejected by the clearing algorithm in order to
maximize the total SW.
2.7.3 Constraints corresponding to power and reserve balances
Global balances First, we have the global power balance equation as
DP (t)− SPFQ(t) = P (t) =
∑
i
Pi(t) ∀t . (46)
Regarding reserves, the total positive and negative reserve deficit by FQ bids must not
exceed the potential maximal positive and negative reserve production by FP bids.
DRp(t)− SRpFQ(t) ≤
∑
S
RpFP
(t) ∀t
DRn(t)− SRnFQ(t) ≤
∑
S
RnFP
(t) ∀t (47)
Global combined balances In addition, since maximal power and nonzero positive
reserve can not be allocated to any block in the same time, the sum of the net power
deficit from FQ bids and the net positive reserve deficit from FQ bids must not exceed the
maximal power amount which can be produced by the FP bids.
DP (t)− SPFQ(t) +DRp(t)− SRpFQ(t) ≤
∑
S
PFT
(t) ∀t (48)
Similarly, the sum of the net power deficit and the net negative reserve deficit from FQ
bids must be greater than the minimal amount which can be produced by the FP bids.
DP (t)− SPFQ(t)− (DRn(t)− SRnFQ(t)) ≥
∑
SPFT (t) (49)
2.7.4 Network constraints
Nominal case We assume that the constraints corresponding to the transmission net-
work connecting the nodes are linear (consider e.g. a DC load flow approach), thus may
be written in the form
Anetq(t) ≤ bnet (50)
Anet ∈ R
N×N may be calculated as
Anet = E
DF TE+ , (51)
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where F ∈ RN×K is the node-branch incidence matrix of the network (K denotes the
number of lines, while N is the number of nodes). E ∈ RN×N denotes the susceptance
matrix whose elements are Ekl = −Ykl for the off-diagonal terms and
Ekk = −
∑
l 6=k
Ekl
(the column sum of off-diagonals) for diagonal elements. Ykl denotes the admittance of
the line between nodes k and l. E+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of E, and ED is a
diagonal matrix with EDkk = Yij. The above formulation may be derived from the phase-
angle approach described in [22] via the expression of the phase-angle vector as described
in [11]. For further information on DC load flow models, see [22] and [9].
The vector bnet corresponds to the maximal power flow values of the lines. q(t) ∈ RN
is the nominal power injection vector resulting from the market clearing. Its elements are
corresponding to the power imbalances (= physical power injections) in each node. The
ith element of q(t), denoted by qi(t) corresponding to the power injection in node i may
be written as
qi(t) = S
PFQ
i (t) + Pi(t)−D
P
i (t) (52)
where
Pi(t) =
∑
j
Pij(t)
Furthermore, according to the assumption regarding the lossless property of the network,
which is usual in DC load flow models, we have∑
i
qi(t) = 0 ∀t (53)
Perturbed case We require that the network constraints must hold also in the case
when the allocated reserves are activated. If (positive) reserves are activated in a node,
e.g. because of an unpredicted increase in the demand, the activation of the reserve has no
consequences for the network. However it is possible that the cause of reserve activation
is in another node. We may view this scenario as a perturbed power injection vector qˆ(t),
for which the network must be also stable
Anetqˆ(t) ≤ bnet ∀qˆ(t)∀t (54)
where
qˆ(t) = q(t) + δ(t) (55)
where δ(t) ∈ RN is the perturbation vector, describing reserve activation. We assume
that reserves may be activated at only one node in the same time, but in this case all of
the allocated reserves (described by the total reserve demand DRpi (t)/D
Rn
i (t)) are acti-
vated. Furthermore, as we have
∑
qi(t) = 0, as described in equation 53, we assume that
the activated reserve must appear in a different node of the network with opposite sign.
Formally, regarding the i-th element of the vector δ
(!∃ i)
(
δi(t) ∈ {D
Rp
i (t),D
Rn
i (t)}
)
(!∃ j 6= i) (δj(t) = −δi(t)) (56)
where !∃ i stands for ’there exists a unique i’.
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2.7.5 Scheduling constraints
Constraints corresponding to the overall activity indicator vij(O) The
following constraints describe that if the block is active in any of the time periods, vij(O) =
1, and 0 otherwise.∑
vij ≤ Tvij(O) ∀(i, j) (i ∈ {1, ..N})(j ∈ {1, ...ni}
vij(O) ≤
∑
vij ∀(i, j) (i ∈ {1, ..N})(j ∈ {1, ...ni} (57)
Constraints corresponding to minimal up and down times Based on the
introduced v variables, these constraints may be derived in the same way as in unit com-
mitment approaches [8, 33] if necessary.
Load gradient constraints Load gradient constraints may be also formulated sim-
ilar to unit commitment approaches, considering the possible activation of the allocated
reserves as well.
(Pij(t+ 1) +Rpij(t+ 1))− (Pij(t)−Rnij(t)) < RUij ∀ t < T
(Pij(t) +Rpij(t))− (Pij(t+ 1)−Rnij(t+ 1)) < RDij ∀ t < T (58)
where RUij and RDij are the ramp-up and ramp-down constraints of the j-th unit in
node i respectively.
2.7.6 Income and cost constraints
Total income constraint The total income (I) from the demand bids must be at
least equal to the cost of supply bids (C).
C ≤ I (59)
Minimum income constraints of generating blocks
KFP =
∑
i
KFPi (60)
where KFPi is detailed in equations (37) and (38).
From the point of view of the generating blocks this amount is an income, which has
to cover the costs of generation
CGij ≤ K
FP
ij ∀(i, j) (i ∈ {1, ..N})(j ∈ {1, ...ni}) (61)
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Distribution of discounts and surpluses among combined bids As we will
see the objective function of the clearing model will be the maximization of total SW.
The SW contribution of the standard bids may be calculated from MCPs, bid PPUs, and
bid amounts. The SW contribution of FP bids is considered as the difference between
their payoff (KFPij ) and their generating cost (C
G
ij ). The variables W
D and W S represent
the payoff discount and payoff surplus assigned to the submitted combined bids. These
variables may be viewed as follows. If we collect all income from the accepted demand
bids and pay all costs regarding the supply bids (including FP and combined bids as well),
thanks to the model constraints there will be a nonnegative residual, which may be divided
among the accepted combined bids as payoff discounts or surpluses. In the following we
define how this residual is distributed among the combined bids.
First, for each combined bid we define an average bid PPU denoted by λ. We average
over each quantity of the submitted combined bid, namely power, positive and negative
reserve amounts. λDij corresponds to the average PPU of the j-th combined demand bid
submitted in node i (average is understood over power and two types of reserve).
λDij =
∑
BDCPi (., j) +
∑
BDCRpi (., j) +
∑
BDCRni (., j)
θDCi (j)
(62)
λSij may be derived similarly.
based on the above values, let us denote the minimal PPU among combined demand
bids by λD, and the maximal PPU among combined supply bids with λ
S
.
We assign the following weights to combined bids
aDij =
λDij − λ
D∑
BDCPi (., j) +
∑
BDCRpi (., j) +
∑
BDCRni (., j)
aSij =
λ
D
− λSij∑
BSCPi (., j) +
∑
BSCRpi (., j) +
∑
BSCRni (., j)
(63)
Finally, we assume that the discount/surplus of every combined bid is proportional to its
weight, considering only the accepted bids.
WDij∑
W
=
aDijy
DC
ij∑
kl a
D
kly
DC
kl +
∑
kl a
S
kly
SC
kl
∀(i, j) (i ∈ {1, ..N})(j ∈ {1, ...ni})
W Sij∑
W
=
aSijy
SC
ij∑
kl a
D
kly
DC
kl +
∑
kl a
S
kly
SC
kl
∀(i, j) (i ∈ {1, ..N})(j ∈ {1, ...ni}) (64)
We do not have to distinguish the accepted bids inW , since if the corresponding bid is not
accepted, the representative element of W is zero. This results in a quadratic constraint
after rearrangement, e.g. in the case of the demand side
WDij
(∑
kl
aDkly
DC
kl +
∑
kl
aSkly
SC
kl
)
= aDijy
DC
ij
∑
W (65)
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2.8 The objective function
The objective function of the model is to maximize the total SW, denoted by Ψ which can
be written as
Ψ =ΨDP +ΨSP +ΨDRp +ΨSRp +ΨDRn +ΨSRn+
KFP − CG +
∑
W
ΨDPi (t) =
(
BDPi (t, .)⊙ (θ
DP
i (t, .)− ϕ
P
i (t))
)
yDPi
ΨSPi (t) =
(
BSPi (t, .)⊙ (ϕ
P
i (t)− θ
SP
i (t, .))
)
ySPi
ΨDRpi (t) =
(
BDRpi (t, .) ⊙ (θ
DRp
i (t, .) − ϕ
Rp
i (t))
)
yDRpi
ΨSRpi (t) =
(
BSRpi (t, .)⊙ (ϕ
Rp
i (t)− θ
SRp
i (t, .))
)
ySRpi
ΨDRni (t) =
(
BDRni (t, .) ⊙ (θ
DRn
i (t, .) − ϕ
Rn
i (t))
)
yDRni
ΨSRni (t) =
(
BSRni (t, .)⊙ (ϕ
Rn
i (t)− θ
SRn
i (t, .))
)
ySRni
(66)
where the notation⊙ stands for the element-wise multiplication, and the notation θDPi (t, .)−
ϕPi (t) stands for a vector, resulting from the element-wise subtraction of the scalar ϕ
P
i (t)
from the vector θDPi (t, .). In this formulation, regarding Ψ
DP
i (t) we consider the accepted
hourly and block bids together. The notation is similar in the case of ΨSPi (t).
3 Discussion
3.1 Computational aspects
The balances and constraints for power and reserves described in subsection 2.7.3 are linear
in the variables and do not pose a serious computational obstacle. Network constraints
described in subsection 2.7.4, scheduling constraints discussed in subsection 2.7.5 are also
linear. In the following we focus on less straightforward constraints: On the one hand on
acceptance constraints derived from logical expressions (implications), and on the other
hand on constraints involving quadratic terms of the variables.
3.1.1 Bid acceptance constraints
It is well known that in a combinatorial optimization framework logical expressions may
be formulated in the terminology of computational constraints (see e.g. [4]). Bid accep-
tance constraints for FQ bids may be formulated with the application of auxiliary binary
variables and the so called bigM method.
Let us consider the constraints described by eq. (42), with a shorter notation
y > 0 → ϕ ≤ Θ y < 0 → ϕ ≥ Θ (67)
where y is the bid acceptance indicator, ϕ is the MCP and Θ is the bid price. The
formulation is equivalent to
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ϕ > Θ → y = 1 ϕ > Θ → y = 0 (68)
The former part of 68 may be formulated as
ϕ− ϕz ≤ Θ
−y1 − (1− z) ≤ −1 (69)
where z is an auxiliary binary variable and ϕ is the upper bound for the MCP (the bigM
in other words).
Regarding the acceptance rule of block bids described by the condition (45), we see
that the form is analogous with the first expression of (42), in the sense that a
f1(x) > b1 → f2(x) ≤ b2
type implication is formulated, which is equivalent to f1(x) ≤ b1 and/or f2(x) ≤ b2. This
formulation is handled by eq. (69).
3.1.2 Constraints corresponding to combined bids
Regarding eq. (65) describing the distribution of surpluses and discounts of combined
bids, we can see that it is a quadratic expression, which holds products of a binary and
a continuous variables (y and W respectively). If we assume upper and lower bounds for
W (denoted by W and W respectively, from which W is potentially 0), and define the
auxiliary variable ζ = yW for each product of this type, we may linearize the expression
ζ = yW as
ζ ≤Wy
ζ ≥Wy
ζ ≤W −W (1− y)
ζ ≥W −W (1− y) (70)
As potentially the number of combined bids is low in the market, such a linear refor-
mulation implies a relatively low number of additional auxiliary variables (ζ-s), so it is
generally advised.
3.1.3 Constraints describing minimum income conditions
Probably the most difficult elements of the proposed formulation are the minimum income
conditions described in eq. (61), which include the terms KFPi, the payoff of flexible
production bids, described by equation (38). These are composed of quadratic expres-
sions holding the product of continuous variables: The MCP’s for power and reserves
(ϕPi , ϕ
Rp
i , ϕ
Rn
i ) and power/reserve production quantities (Pi,j , Rpi,j, Rni,j) – thus they
are a critical point regarding computational issues. If such flexible-production units and
constraints are present, the implied problem falls into the class of non-convex quadratically
constrained quadratic (QCQP) programs. The more recent advances on such problems are
described in [13]. Further papers discuss the possible approaches for this problem class, as
exact quadratic convex reformulation [5] or piecewise linear and edge-concave relaxations
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[20]. Results corresponding to general non-convex mixed-integer nonlinear problems are
surveyed in [7].
Despite the recent advances described in [13], QCQP is still considered as a hard prob-
lem class, for which large-scale implementations pose a significant challenge. Regarding
this issue, let us however recite the consideration described in [14], namely that it is likely
that steady progress in computing technologies could well curb the above difficulties within
the coming years.
3.2 Prospects for generalizations
How the proposed model could be generalized for the procurement of multiple (i.e. sec-
ondary and tertiary) reserves simultaneously is a straightforward question. In the context
of the described framework, tertiary reserves would mean reserves with higher response
time, but otherwise they are considered as the reserves discussed before (capacity alloca-
tion payment is assumed). Such an extension is possible, however it would significantly
increase the complexity of the model.
Naturally, in such a framework regarding one-hour and multiple hour single product
bids the secondary (S) and tertiary (T) reserves must be distinguished, as well as the MCPs
for which additional variables shall be defined. Regarding FP bids, instead the variables
Rp and Rn similar variables as RSp, RSn, RTp RTn should be used corresponding to
allocated amounts of secondary and tertiary reserves. Addition parameters (maximally
allocated S and T type reserves must be also considered).
Additional constraints in this case have be included to describe the asymmetry of
substitution relations – e.g. the sum of allocated S and T type reserves for any hour must
not exceed the maximal amount of T type reserve which may be allocated, and so on.
Ramp limits of the units must be considered to formulate such constraints. The combined
bids would be the least problematic elements in this framework. they only have to be
extended with an amount regarding T type reserves, but every other aspects of them may
stay the same.
Auxiliary variables of course must be updated/extended as well (e.g. the total net
demand for S and T type reserves must be distinguished, etc.). Constraints corresponding
to the range of variables must be updated, as the sum of allocated power, S and T type of
positive reserves must not exceed the maximal production value P (and mutatis mutandis
in the case of P ). Balances must be updated as well. Inequalities 47 must be formulated
distinctly for S and T type reserves, and global combined balances (eq. 48) also have to
be updated.
Network constraints in this case must consider perturbed power injection vectors cor-
responding to the activation of tertiary reserves as well. Load gradient constraints must
be formulated considering both types of reserve, and naturally the income and cost con-
straints must me modified as well to account for the now product type. In the objective
function, the new terms corresponding to T type reserve bids must be included.
4 Conclusions
The formulation of SW based simultaneous clearing methods for power and ancillary ser-
vices is a complex task even in the case when the network constraints are neglected. In the
current paper we proposed a market coupling approach of integrated power-reserve markets
including innovative orders which could help the efficient bidding of generating units and
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by adding additional bidding alternatives make the market more flexible. In addition the
proposed formulation also includes network constraints for the nominal (or undisturbed)
case and also considers scenarios when the reserves are activated. The described approach
results in a computationally hard, but likely not out-of reach problem.
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Appendix A: Nomenclature
Parameter interpretation dimension
T Number of time periods -
N Number of nodes in the transmission network -
K Number of lines in the transmission network -
ni
number of generating units submitting
flexible production (FP) bids in node i
-
n
Total number of generating units submitting
flexible production (FP) bids
-
mDPi the number of standard demand power bids at node i -
mDP the total number of standard demand power bids -
mSPi the number of standard supply power bids at node i. -
mSP the total number of standard supply power bids -
m
DRp
i the number of standard demand positive reserve bids at node i -
mDRp the total number of standard demand positive reserve bids -
mDRni the number of standard demand negative reserve bids at node i -
mDRn the total number of standard demand negative reserve bids -
m
SRp
i the number of standard supply positive reserve bids at node i -
mSRp the total number of standard supply positive reserve bids -
mSRni the number of standard supply negative reserve bids at node i -
mSRn the total number of standard supply negative reserve bids -
mDCi the number of combined demand bids at node i -
mDC the total number of combined demand bids -
mSCi the number of combined supply bids at node i -
mSC the total number of combined supply bids -
m the total number of fixed quantity (FQ) bids -
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Parameter interpretation dimension
BDPi
Matrix of bid quantities of standard
demand power bids corresponding to node i
MW
B
DRp
i
Matrix of bid quantities of standard positive
reserve demand bids corresponding to node i
MW
B
DNp
i
Matrix of bid quantities of standard negative
reserve demand bids corresponding to node i
MW
BDCPi
Matrix of bid quantities corresponding to the power components
of the combined demand bids submitted in node i
MW
B
DCRp
i
Matrix of bid quantities corresponding to the positive reserve
components of the combined demand bids submitted in node i
MW
BDCRni
Matrix of bid quantities corresponding to the negative reserve
components of the combined demand bids submitted in node i
MW
BSPi
Matrix of bid quantities of standard
supply power bids corresponding to node i
MW
B
SRp
i
Matrix of bid quantities of standard positive
reserve supply bids corresponding to node i
MW
B
SNp
i
Matrix of bid quantities of standard negative
reserve supply bids corresponding to node i
MW
BSCPi
Matrix of bid quantities corresponding to the power components
of the combined supply bids submitted in node i
MW
B
SCRp
i
Matrix of bid quantities corresponding to the positive reserve
components of the combined supply bids submitted in node i
MW
BSCRni
Matrix of bid quantities corresponding to the negative reserve
components of the combined supply bids submitted in node i
MW
P Matrix of the maximal production values of units MW
P Matrix of the minimal production values of units MW
Rp
Matrix of the upper bounds for positive reserve
allocation values of units
MW
Rn
Matrix of the upper bounds for negative reserve
allocation values of units
MW
αij fixed cost of operation of unit j of node i EUR
βij variable cost of production of unit j of node i EUR/MW
Anet matrix of transmission network constraints -
bnet vector of maximal power flow of network lines MW
RUij ramp-up limit of unit j in node i MW
RDij ramp-down limit of unit j in node i MW
E susceptance matrix Ω−1
F the node-branch incidence matrix of the network -
Yk,l susceptance of the line between nodes k and l Ω
−1
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Parameter interpretation dimension
ΘDPi
bid PPU matrix of the standard power
demand bids corresponding to node i
EUR/MW
ΘDRpi
bid PPU matrix of the standard positive reserve
demand bids corresponding to node i
EUR/MW
ΘDRni
bid PPU matrix of the standard negative reserve
demand bids corresponding to node i
EUR/MW
ΘSPi
bid PPU matrix of the standard power
supply bids corresponding to node i
-
ΘSRpi
bid PPU matrix of the standard positive reserve
supply bids corresponding to node i
EUR/MW
ΘSRni
bid PPU matrix of the standard negative reserve
supply bids corresponding to node i
EUR/MW
ΘDCi
bid price (row) vector of the combined demand
bids corresponding to node i
EUR
ΘSCi
bid price (row) vector of the combined supply
bids corresponding to node i
EUR
λDij
average PPU of the jth combined demand bid
submitted in node i
EUR/MW
λSij
average PPU of the jth combined suply bid
submitted in node i
EUR/MW
λD minimal average PPU among combined demand bids EUR/MW
λ
S
maximal average PPU among combined demand bids EUR/MW
aDij
weight of the jth combined demand bid
submitted in node i
EUR
aSij
weight of the jth combined supply bid
submitted in node i
EUR
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Variables
Variable interpretation dimension
vij(t) activity indicator of block j of node i at time t -
vi(t) vector of activity indicators of node i at time t -
v(t) vector of activity indicators at time t -
Pij(t) power production value allocated to block j of node i at time t MW
Pi(t) total power production value of node i at time t MW
P (t) total power production value at time t MW
Rpij(t) positive reserve value allocated to block j of node i at time t MW
Rpi(t) total positive reserve value allocated node i at time t MW
Rnij(t) negative reserve value allocated to block j of node i at time t MW
Rni(t) total negative reserve value of node i at time t MW
ϕPi (t) the market clearing price (MCP) of power at node i at time t EUR/MW
ϕ
Rp
i (t) MCP of positive reserve at node i at time t EUR/MW
ϕRni (t) MCP of negative reserve at node i at time t EUR/MW
ybij
bid acceptance indicator of the j-th bid of type b
submitted in node i
-
WDij
Payoff discount of the j-th combined demand bid
submitted in node i
EUR
W Sij
Payoff surplus of the j-th combined supply bid
submitted in node i
EUR∑
W Sum of payoff surpluses and discounts EUR
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Auxiliary variables
Variable interpretation dimension
DPi (t) Total power demand at node i in time period t MW
DP (t) Total net power demand in time period t MW
D
Rp
i (t) Total positive reserve demands at node i at time t MW
DRni (t) Total negative reserve demands at node i at time t MW
DRp(t) Total net positive reserve demand at time t MW
DRn(t) Total net negative reserve demand at time t MW
S
PFQ
i (t) Total power supply by FQ bids at node i in time period t MW
SPFQ(t) Total net power supply by FQ bids in time period t MW
S
RpFQ
i
Total amount of positive reserves supplied by FQ bids
at node i at time t
MW
S
RnFQ
i
Total amount of negative reserves supplied by FQ bids
at node i at time t
MW
SRpFQ
Total net amount of positive reserves supplied
by FQ bids at time t
MW
SRnFQ
Total net amount of negative reserves supplied
by FQ bids at time t
MW
q(t) power injection vector MW
qˆ(t) perturbed power injection vector MW
δ perturbation vector, describing reserve activation -
I Total income EUR
Ii Income in node i EUR
IDPi Income in node i from power demand bids EUR
I
DRp
i Income in node i from positive reserve demand bids EUR
IDRni Income in node i from negative reserve demand bids EUR
IDCi Income in node i from combined bids EUR
C Total cost EUR
Ci Cost in node i EUR
CDPi Cost of power demand bids in node i EUR
C
DRp
i Cost of positive reserve demand bids in node i EUR
CDRni Cost of negative reserve demand bids in node i EUR
CDCi Cost of combined bids in node i EUR
KFPij Payoff of the jth generating unit in node i EUR
KFPi Payoff of FP bids in node i EUR
KFP Total payoff of FP bids EUR
CGij Generating cost of the jth generating unit in node i EUR
CGi Generating cost of units in node i EUR
CG Total generating cost of units submitting FP bids EUR
Ψ total social welfare EUR
z computational auxiliary variable for bid acceptance constraints -
ζ comp. auxiliary variable for surplus distribution constraints -
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The argument notation in the case of a variable represents the corresponding time
period, e.g. DPi (t) denotes the total power demand at node i in time period t, while in the
case of parameter vectors, it represents the corresponding element, e.g. ΘDCi (j) stands for
the jth element of the vector ΘDCi . Two arguments are used in the case of matrices, e.g.
P (i, j) stands for the element in the ith row and jth column of the matrix P . M(., j) and
M(i, .) denote the jth column and the ith row of the matrix M respectively.
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